INTRODUCTION
On September 4, 2014, Governor Robert F. McDonnell and his wife, Maureen G. McDonnell, were convicted in federal court of various crimes related to their relationship with Jonnie Williams, a Virginia businessman, and his company Star Scientific.
1 Earlier in the year, the McDonnells were charged in a fourteen-count indictment primarily consisting of public corruption charges.
2 Governor McDonnell faced one count of conspiracy to commit honestservices wire fraud, three counts of honest-services wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to obtain property under color of official right, six counts of obtaining property under color of official right, and two counts of providing false statements, one on a financial statement and one on a loan application. 3 Governor McDonnell was convicted on all counts except the two false statement charges. 4 3. Id. Conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012). Honest-services wire fraud is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (defining scheme to defraud under the mail and wire fraud statutes to include a scheme -to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services‖). Conspiracy to obtain property under color of official rights and obtaining property under color of official right, also known as Hobbs Act violations, are codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012). The false statements statute at issue is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2012).
4. Verdict, supra note 1.
The indictment tells a story of corruption. It asserts that the former Governor traded official acts for money, goods, and services. 12 The indictment suggests the McDonnells received monetary gifts, loans, trips, and merchandise in exchange for help promoting Star Scientific products, specifically for encouraging state university researchers to study the products to increase 5. See Indictment, supra note 2, ¶ ¶ 108-23. The relevant obstruction charge is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (2012).
6. See Verdict, supra note 1. , http://www.dailypress.com/news/politi cs/dp-nws/mcdonnell-trial-top-story-20141220-story.html (suggesting that following the announcement of the jury verdicts, -it was like the shocking finale of a summer-long soap opera‖); Ruth Marcus, McDonnell Case is Not Politics as Usual, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-mcdonnell-case-is-not-politi cs-as-usual/2014/01/23/0b6cc2b2-846d-11e3-9dd4-e7278db80d86_story.html (noting both sides of the argument).
12. See Indictment, supra note 2, ¶ 22.
their marketability as drugs and for attempting to help get Star Scientific products included for coverage by the state health insurance program. 13 If the verdicts reflect the truth of the allegations in the indictment, the prosecution is merely the government's attempt to address corruption and influence peddling.
Conversely, the McDonnells suggest that no unlawful conduct occurred. Though Williams gave the Governor and his family gifts, loans, and goods, the defense argued that the Governor took no official acts for Williams's benefit. 14 The defense asserted that Governor McDonnell merely engaged in behavior that governors routinely engage in, including arranging meetings that connect businesses with state government and attending receptions and luncheons. 15 The defense suggests that the prosecution was a misguided attempt to criminalize legal behavior embedded in everyday politics. 16 Both sides could be correct. It is possible the McDonnells violated laws that criminalize politics as usual. However, it is also possible the McDonnells are guilty of public corruption under laws that reasonably criminalize public corruption. Whether the laws at issue appropriately punish public corruption or merely criminalize politics as usual depends on the laws' scope. How that issue should be resolved depends on a core point of contention between the prosecution and defense: whether Governor McDonnell promised to take or took official action on behalf of Williams and Star Scientific. The trial court and Fourth Circuit have spoken in this case and found that Governor McDonnell did take official acts for Williams's benefit. This article considers how those courts addressed the issue.
This article discusses two additional issues the McDonnell case raises. The first issue is how much evidence is necessary to sustain a conviction for attempting to obstruct an official proceeding. Mrs. McDonnell was convicted of attempting to obstruct the grand jury in this case for sending a misleading note to Williams, but her actions were deemed insufficient to support her obstruction conviction. 17 The other issue relates to the McDonnells' sentencing. The sentences they received were much shorter than the sentences calculated using the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 18 This article considers the official act issue, the obstruction issue, and the sentencing issue. Part Honest-services wire fraud is of fairly recent vintage, though wire fraud has been unlawful for years. 63 Wire fraud is similar to mail fraud and occurs when a person engages in a scheme to defraud by using the wires in interstate or foreign commerce. 64 Honest-services wire fraud exists when a person plans a scheme to defraud which causes one party to violate a duty of loyalty or trust owed to another, but which does not cause direct financial harm to the party owed the duty of loyalty or trust.
65
The honest-services mail/wire fraud cause of action has had an uneven path. In McNally v. United States, the Court rejected the theory of honest-services wire fraud when the government attempted to expand the reach of wire and mail fraud to cover schemes in which the putative victim was not defrauded of prop- 66 McNally involved an insurance scheme in which defendants chose the insurance agents who were to secure workmen's compensation insurance for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, then forced the agents to share some of the commissions with other insurance agencies the defendants designated. 67 The defendants then funneled money to friends and insurance agencies in which they had a financial interest. 68 Ostensibly, no one was defrauded by the scheme. 69 The insurance provider was not defrauded of money because the commissions were regular commissions that the insurance company expected to pay to an agent. 70 Kentucky was not defrauded of money because the commissions were part of the fair premium Kentucky expected to pay. 71 The agents who were forced to share the commissions may have been hurt by being required to share commissions they arguably had earned, but they were not tricked or defrauded.
72
The federal government prosecuted the case under the theory that the defendants had defrauded Kentucky and its citizens of honest services and -the right to have the Commonwealth's affairs conducted honestly.‖ 73 The Supreme Court rejected that theory, finding that the mail/wire fraud statute protected money and property rights, but not -the intangible right of the citizenry to good government. did not provide a definition of the intangible right to honest services. 76 However, in Skilling v. United States, the Court clarified the boundaries of honest-services wire/mail fraud by narrowing it to apply only to schemes involving bribery and kickbacks. 77 Consequently, for all its seeming uncertainty, the application of the honest-services fraud claim to the McDonnell case is simple: if the wires were used to facilitate a bribery or kickback scheme, honest-services fraud applies. 78 Similarly, for the Hobbs Act to apply in this context, Governor McDonnell must have knowingly accepted a bribe. 79 The Hobbs Act bars persons from affecting commerce through extortion. 80 Its definition of extortion includes obtaining property from another -under color of official right,‖ 81 which historically was considered the equivalent of taking a bribe. 82 Though the definition of extortion under color of official right under the Hobbs Act has been broadened under the Hobbs Act, taking or soliciting a bribe still forms its essence.
B. Bribery and Official Acts
Bribery in the public arena requires that a public official promise to take, or actually take, official action in exchange for gifts or other things of value. 84 80. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012) (-Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.‖). with violating the federal bribery statute, 85 it informs honestservices wire fraud and the Hobbs Act. 86 Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that a public official violates the Hobbs Act when that official -has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.‖ 87 However, what constitutes an official act, an issue at the heart of the McDonnell case, is a live one.
88
The federal bribery statute defines an official act as -any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit.‖ 89 This definition leaves the scope of an official act somewhat unclear. Under the definition, an official act could be thought to be limited to the duties that an official is required to discharge. Conversely, an official act could be thought to extend to every action an official takes in the official's official capacity. 90 Governor McDonnell argued that an official act should be defined relatively narrowly and sought a definition of an official act that focused on the governor's official duties and functions. 91 In United States v. McDonnell, the Fourth Circuit explained that official acts are not narrowly limited to an official's official duties. 92 Rather, official acts can include not only actions that a public official must discharge, but also can -encompass the customary and settled practices of an office . . . .‖ 93 If the acts at issue are activities that a public official routinely engages in while in the official's official capacity, the activity can qualify as an official 85 act. 94 The key is not whether the act is required by law or is significant in scope, but whether the act is related to -influenc[ing] a ‗question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy' that may be brought before the government.‖ 95 Almost any action taken by a public official can be an official act if it relates to an official issue that can be brought or has been brought before the government. 96 The Fourth Circuit's decision was not surprising, as it flowed directly from United States Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent. In United States v. Birdsall, the Court considered what constituted official action in the context of the precursor statute to the federal bribery statute. 97 There, the Court determined that actions not required by law, but established by settled practice, could constitute official action. 98 In United States v. SunDiamond Growers of California, the Supreme Court took a similar position regarding what constitutes an official act under the current federal bribery statute. 99 In Sun-Diamond, the Court noted that many acts that were not a part of an official's official duty could constitute official acts when they were undertaken in relation to a matter before the government. role as a congressman, could qualify as official acts. 102 Jefferson's core criminal conduct involved helping to arrange deals between American companies and African entities on the condition that money would be directed to businesses owned by Jefferson's family members. 103 Jefferson argued that the actions he took did not amount to official acts under the relevant statutes and that there was no exchange of money for acts as the statutes required. 104 Jefferson urged a narrow definition, arguing that an official act had to be related to a legislative or governmental function or process. 105 The court rejected that position, deeming official acts to include those activities in which an official in the defendant's position customarily engages in. 106 Though the official act must be related to a government decision or action, it need not relate to voting on, or introducing, legislation. 107 The court ruled that Jefferson's use of his position to help facilitate the success of various business ventures of people paying him to do so constituted official acts supporting Jefferson's convictions. 108 Given the Jefferson decision, Governor McDonnell's argument regarding the scope of official acts was nearly certain to be rejected by the Fourth Circuit.
Given how the Supreme Court and other courts have defined official acts, the Fourth Circuit's decision that the actions Governor McDonnell promised to, and actually did, take to help Williams and Star Scientific were official acts is no surprise.
109 Gov- Once the court decided that official acts had occurred, the dispute shifted to whether Governor McDonnell took goods in exchange for performing, or promising to perform, these official acts. 116 Once the Fourth Circuit found that official acts had occurred and money changed hands, it was nearly obligated to allow the jury to decide whether Governor McDonnell traded money for official acts. 117 Ample evidence was presented to support this when he exchanged favors for money Those who are concerned that the line between bribery and politics as usual has not been sufficiently defined or that Governor McDonnell's acts were not quite serious enough to constitute bribery should consider the full breadth of the federal bribery statute. Its first part relates to bribery; its second part relates to illegal gratuities.
120 Bribery focuses on paying or offering to pay an official to influence an official act, or requesting or receiving payment in order to influence or take an official action.
121 It suggests a purchase of official action. Illegal gratuities focus on offering payment or paying a public official because of an official act already performed or that was to be performed. 122 It is akin to a thank you for a job well done. The illegal gratuities law can be violated even if the public official was planning to perform, would have performed, or actually did perform the official action without any expectation of payment.
123
In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, the dispute focused on illegal gratuities and considered whether giving an official a gift merely because of the recipient's position violated the illegal gratuities law. 124 The district court had determined that the illegal gratuities statute is violated whenever a gift is given to a covered public official by virtue of his position. 125 The defense argued that such a gift had to be given in relation to specific official acts taken or to be taken regarding business in front of the official. 126 The Court determined that gifts given mere- ly by virtue of the official's position did not violate the law when there was no specific official action that could be linked to the gift.
127
Bribery and illegal gratuities are both illegal, though they are treated very differently under the statute. Bribery is punishable by up to fifteen years in prison, while an illegal gratuities conviction is punishable by up to two years in prison.
128 Though the potential punishments may be quite different, the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the -Guidelines‖) do not treat public sector bribery and illegal gratuities nearly as differently as 18 U.S.C. § 201 suggests. 129 Consequently, even if the McDonnells were passive participants in this matter-the indictment claims they were not-accepting payment knowing that the payment was for official acts taken or to be taken is unlawful and is serious.
The McDonnell case clarifies bribery, honest-services wire fraud, and the Hobbs Act's under-color-of-official-right extortion. Those crimes entail three questions: Was money offered or paid to a public official, did the public official engage in or promise to engage in official acts, and was the money offered tied to the promise to engage in official acts?
130 Whether money was offered or paid should be an easy question. Whether official acts were promised may be a difficult fact question in some cases, but what constitutes an official act has been clarified. 131 The Fourth Circuit has determined that almost any act a public official takes in the official's official capacity can be an official act. Given this clarification, the focus should be on whether the act taken is tied to official business in front of the official or the government. Whether the money was tied to the promise to engage in official acts is a quintessential fact question that should be left to the jury to decide. The McDonnell case may not have been an easy case, but it should make future cases easier to decide assuming the Supreme Court allows it to stand. The rules are relatively simple; officials are not supposed to get paid by citizens or businesses to do their jobs, and officials are not to be thanked monetarily for doing their jobs. If that criminalizes politics as usual, then politics as usual will need to change.
III. MRS. MCDONNELL'S OBSTRUCTION CHARGE
Though the jury convicted Mrs. McDonnell of attempting to obstruct a grand jury proceeding, 133 Judge Spencer found insufficient evidence to support the conviction and granted Mrs. McDonnell's post-trial Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on that conviction. 134 The indictment asserted that Mrs. McDonnell attempted to obstruct the grand jury proceeding by sending Jonnie Williams a box of clothing with a misleading note suggesting that the clothing was merely lent to her, rather than given to her as a gift. 135 In his opinion vacating the conviction, Judge Spencer noted that -obstruction of justice requires more than just a misleading note.‖ 136 However, given that the court did not dismiss the obstruction charge before trial, a misleading note presumably could be considered part of a larger plan constituting an attempt to obstruct justice. 137 Unfortunately, the court did not clarify precisely In this case, the official proceeding is the grand jury proceeding that triggered the indictment. 140 Though the official proceeding need not have been pending or imminent at the time of the attempt to obstruct it, 141 the proceeding must have been foreseeable at the time the defendant took the action that constitutes obstruction. 142 In addition, a defendant must have taken an action that could have the natural and probable effect of influencing the grand jury proceeding. 143 A defendant who is unaware that his or her actions will likely affect a grand jury proceeding cannot be proven to have had the intent necessary to obstruct such a grand jury proceeding.
144 Though a defendant who merely sends a misleading note to a friend does not obstruct a grand jury proceeding, a defendant who creates a misleading document to present to a grand jury in an attempt to influence the grand jury arguably has attempted to obstruct an official proceeding. 145 The attempt to obstruct need not be successful to trigger guilt. 
B. Proof of Obstruction
The prosecution appeared to suggest through the indictment that Mrs. McDonnell did more than merely send a misleading note; it suggested that the note was a part of a broader plan to mislead the grand jury. 147 The indictment indicated that law enforcement officers interviewed Mrs. McDonnell about her relationship with Williams in mid-February 2013.
148 During the interview, Mrs. McDonnell falsely claimed that she was making payments on one of the loans that Williams had provided to the McDonnells and that she falsely stated that Governor McDonnell and Williams had met years before they actually met.
149 Soon after the interview, the McDonnells engaged in multiple attempts to recast the nature of some of their dealings with Williams. 150 Similarly, after the interview, Mrs. McDonnell sent the misleading note to Williams. 151 Mrs. McDonnell appeared to draft the misleading note to create the impression that the clothing had merely been lent to her rather than given to her. 152 Presumably, the misleading note could have been part of a plan to influence a grand jury that might eventually see the note and might consider whether the clothing was lent or given to Mrs. McDonnell relevant to whether she or others had committed a crime.
The defense claimed that the note was insufficient proof of an attempt to obstruct an official proceeding.
153 According to the defense, the note was not literally false and, therefore, could not support Mrs. McDonnell's conviction. 154 In addition, the defense claimed that the note was unconnected to the grand jury proceedtually obstructed, justice. Under our approach, a jury could find such defendant guilty.‖).
147. If the misleading note was the only evidence against Mrs. McDonnell supporting the obstruction conviction, vacating the conviction was necessary. Though the court found Mrs. McDonnell's note sufficiently misleading to potentially obstruct the grand jury proceeding, it also found that the note was insufficiently connected to the grand jury proceeding to serve as sufficient proof of an attempt to obstruct the grand jury proceeding.
158
In order to intend to obstruct the grand jury proceeding, Mrs. McDonnell had to know or foresee that the grand jury proceeding would occur. 159 The prosecution failed to prove that Mrs. McDonnell knew or believed that a federal grand jury proceeding would ever occur. 160 Indeed, at the time the misleading note was sent, based on the evidence presented at trial, she knew only of the federal securities investigation of Williams and of a state investigation. 161 The court also found that even had Mrs. McDonnell foreseen or known of the grand jury's existence, insufficient evidence of Mrs. McDonnell's intent to obstruct had been presented. 162 The intent to obstruct requires that the obstructing actions have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice. 163 Creating and sending a misleading note that the drafter had no reason to believe would be presented to a grand jury does not have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice. 164 In this case, the note was sent to Williams, who Mrs. McDonnell may not have thought would be a grand jury witness. 165 Without evidence to prove that Mrs. McDonnell believed that the note would be presented to a grand jury, there was insufficient evidence to support the claim that the drafting and sending of the note would qualify as an attempt to obstruct an official proceeding.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Though the court may have been correct that insufficient evidence was presented to support the conviction, it did not indicate how much evidence would have been sufficient to support a conviction for obstructing a grand jury proceeding. 167 That issue is important because, in the context of this case, it appeared Mrs. McDonnell intended to do more than merely send a misleading note. 168 The misleading note that Mrs. McDonnell sent was not sent in a vacuum. 169 It was sent after she was interviewed by law enforcement officers about matters related to Williams and money he had provided to the McDonnells. 170 Importantly, the note was sent to Williams, who knew that the clothes were gifts to Mrs. McDonnell that he did not expect to be returned. 171 Indeed, the clothes were returned nearly two years after they were purchased. 172 one who saw the note into believing that the clothes were not expensive gifts from Williams or to create a trail that suggested the clothes were not gifts. Misleading someone other than Williams is not the same as attempting to obstruct an official proceeding. However, the note could have been an attempt to mislead law enforcement officers who might investigate the clothing or a misguided attempt to provide Williams with evidence suggesting that gifts had not been given. Such an attempt is not necessarily sufficient to support an obstruction charge. 173 However, it is more than merely sending a misleading note.
Had Mrs. McDonnell drafted the note and given it to Williams in an effort to have him present a story to a foreseeable grand jury, the obstruction charge would have been viable. 174 The indictment did not allege that. 175 However, the indictment did suggest that Mrs. McDonnell did more than merely send a misleading note. 176 The note was merely one piece in a process. Assuming the allegations from the indictment were proven at trial, just how close the indictment came to sufficiently supporting its claim is an interesting question that this case leaves open.
IV. SENTENCING
How the McDonnells were sentenced may be the most interesting aspect of this case. The McDonnells were convicted of serious crimes, and the federal Guidelines, which apply to their crimes, appear to recommend significant sentences. 177 Nonetheless, Judge in April 2011, along with a handwritten note.‖). 173. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (-We do not believe that uttering false statements to an investigating agent . . . who might or might not testify before a grand jury is sufficient to make out a violation of the catchall provision of § 1503.‖).
174. Cf. id. at 601 (suggesting that providing false records directly to grand jury could sustain obstruction charge).
175. See Indictment, supra note 2, ¶ ¶ 107, 123. Spencer sentenced Governor McDonnell to twenty-four months in prison and sentenced Mrs. McDonnell to one year and one day in prison. 178 Brief explanations of why the Guidelines exist and how guideline sentences are calculated are important to understanding what Judge Spencer did and why the sentencing is particularly interesting.
A. Sentencing Guidelines
Before the Guidelines were promulgated, federal judges were given broad discretion to determine criminal sentences. 179 Crimes had statutory maximum and minimum sentences, but inside those limits sentences were largely unregulated. 180 This latitude led to widely divergent sentences for similar crimes. 181 The United States Sentencing Commission (the -Commission‖) was formed to bring uniformity to sentencing. 182 The Commission created the Guidelines, in part, by examining the factors that judges historically considered when sentencing defendants.
183
Though the Guidelines were informed by historical data from judicial sentencing, the Commission's opinions have affected the Guidelines over time. 184 The Guidelines standardize sentences by attempting to treat criminal conduct of like severity in like fashion and to treat criminal conduct of differing severity differently.
185 The Guidelines calculate an offense level based on the defendant's criminal conduct and combines that offense level with the defendant's crimi-
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THE MCDONNELL CASE 261 nal history to determine a guideline sentence range. 186 Before United States v. Booker, judges were required to give a sentence inside of the guideline sentencing range, subject to pre-approved grounds for departure from that range.
187 Some departures were based on grounds explicitly approved by the Commission; 188 other departures could be based on grounds relevant to sentencing that the Commission had not considered. 189 Now, the Guidelines are advisory. 190 A judge can determine a defendant's sentence based on the guideline sentence range and whatever factors the judge deems relevant to punishment. 191 The judge can do so regardless of whether such factors are considered grounds for departure under the Guidelines, as long as the sentence is inside the relevant statutory maximum and minimum of the subject crimes and is consistent with the factors noted in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
B. Calculating Sentences
Guideline sentences can be calculated relatively simply, though the calculation can become somewhat complicated in any particular case. The first step is to find the crime the defendant was convicted of in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the -Manual‖).
193
Each federal crime and its offense level can be found in the Manual or can be correlated to a section in the Manual. 194 Every crime has a base offense level based on the seriousness of the crime. The base offense level is then adjusted based on the defendant's conduct. 196 For example, if the defendant's course of conduct involved multiple acts of deceit, the offense level of the crime might be adjusted upward to reflect the fact that a course of conduct involving multiple bad acts is more culpable than one involving a single bad act. 197 Similarly, when a crime involves fraud, the size of the defendant's gain or the victim's loss is a factor that affects the offense level. 198 The offense level may also be adjusted depending on the victim's characteristics, the scope of the defendant's role in the criminal conduct, and whether the defendant attempted to obstruct justice, even if the obstruction was not charged. 199 After all factors listed in the Guidelines are considered, the crime yields an offense level.
200
The process is repeated for each crime of which the defendant was convicted. 201 The crimes and offense levels are then combined so that a single offense level for the defendant's criminal conduct can be found. 202 The sentencing rules that determine how criminal counts are grouped effectively lessen the effect of a prosecutor's charging decisions. 203 For example, if a prosecutor is faced with two identical courses of conduct, the prosecutor ought not be able to increase a guideline sentence merely by charging the courses of conduct differently, such as by breaking up one course of conduct into multiple counts, so that the defendant is convicted of more overall counts. Once the overall offense level has been calculated, the defendant's criminal history is assessed. 204 The more severe the defendant's criminal history, the longer the guideline sentence range will be. 205 A defendant with a more serious criminal history is presumed to deserve a longer punishment than a defendant with a less serious criminal history who engages in the same criminal conduct. 206 The offense level and the defendant's criminal history are plotted on a sentencing grid, with the offense level on the vertical axis and the defendant's criminal history on the horizontal axis. 207 The guideline sentence range for months of imprisonment is listed where the offense level intersects with the defendant's criminal history. 208 Although it is no longer mandatory to follow the Guidelines, a sentence inside of the sentencing range will be deemed presumptively valid. 209 The judge may then sentence however the judge deems appropriate consistent with statutory maximums and minimums and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
C. The Guidelines and the McDonnells
The calculation of the guideline sentence in the McDonnell case was fairly complex. However, rather than discuss the entire sentencing calculation, this section considers a simplified calculation based on the general nature of the charges of which the McDonnells were convicted. At base, Governor McDonnell was convicted of taking bribes; Mrs. McDonnell was convicted of participating in the scheme to take bribes. 211 In addition, Mrs. McDonnell was convicted of obstructing an official proceeding, though that conviction was vacated. 212 The indictment suggests that Governor UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:237 McDonnell attempted to cover up some of his financial dealings with Williams and Star Scientific, but he was acquitted of the false statement charges brought based on that evidence.
213
A simplified sentencing calculation of Governor McDonnell's offenses proceeds as follows. The base offense level for a Hobbs Act/wire fraud violation of this type is 14 because Governor McDonnell is a public official. 214 The offense level increases by four because the offense involved an elected official. 215 The offense level then increases by two if more than one bribe was deemed to be involved. 216 The offense level further increases by six if the bribes were valued between $30,000 and $70,000, or by ten if the bribes were valued between $120,000 and $200,000. 217 There is a dispute regarding the value of Williams's gifts. 218 The face value of the money and gifts provided by Williams under counts six through eleven total just under $140,000.
219
However, the McDonnells claim that much of the value of the putative bribes constitute loans that the McDonnells were prepared to repay with interest. 220 If that is so, calculating the bribe as the face value of the loans may not seem appropriate. Excluding the loans, the value of the gifts listed in counts six through eleven total just under $19,000. value of the loans, the gifts plus the value of the loans would be just over $30,000, and the offense level would increase by six.
222
However, it is important to note that the gain/loss calculation above does not include the value of the gifts Williams gave to the McDonnell family that were deemed subject to forfeiture, but were not subjects of specific counts, in the indictment. 223 'N 2014) . Treating the loans as having a value of 10% of the amount lent is not meant to be a precise valuation of the loans. It merely recognizes that the loans had some value to the McDonnells, but arguably should not be valued as if the loan was a gift that was not going to be repaid. The key issue is that the loans can be valued in a way that places the value of the gifts/bribes somewhere between $30,000 and $140,000 for sentencing purposes.
223. See Indictment, supra note 2, ¶ 117, Forfeiture Notice (showing more property and gifts to be forfeited than were used for specific counts in the indictment). guideline sentence would be 97 to 121 months in prison. 228 Governor McDonnell was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison. 229 Mrs. McDonnell's sentence calculation is similar. Her base offense level for a Hobbs Act/honest-services violation is 12 because she is not a public official. 230 Her offense level increases by four because the offense involved an elected official. 231 If multiple bribes were involved, her offense level increases by two. 232 The issue of the value of the gifts is slightly different for Mrs. McDonnell because she was acquitted of counts nine and eleven of the indictment. 233 If 10% of the face value of the loans, rather than the full face value of the loans is added to the value of gifts for the counts of which she was convicted, the result would yield just over $27,000 and a four-level increase to her offense level. 236 If the full face value of the loans is counted, the result would be just over $117,000, but less than $120,000 in money and goods received. 237 Based on that amount, her offense level would rise by eight. 238 As with the calculation above regarding Governor McDonnell, Mrs. McDonnell's value calculation does not include other gifts provided to her and her family as a result of the scheme. 239 Mrs. McDonnell's guideline sentence would depend on how her conduct is characterized. If Mrs. McDonnell accepted a single bribe that involved just over $27,000, her offense level would be 20. 240 With the lowest criminal history, her guideline sentence would be thirty-three to forty-one months in prison. 241 If Mrs. McDonnell accepted multiple bribes that involved just over $27,000, her offense level would be 22 and her guideline sentence would be forty-one to fifty-one months in prison. 242 If Mrs. McDonnell accepted multiple bribes that involved nearly $140,000, her offense level would be 28 and her guideline sentence would be seventy-eight to ninety-seven months in prison. 243 Mrs. McDonnell was sentenced to one year and one day in prison.
D. Sentencing the McDonnells
Judge Spencer departed from the guideline sentencing ranges for both Governor and Mrs. McDonnell. Whether his departures are qualitatively large or small may depend on how one views the McDonnells' course of conduct. Whether the departures are appropriate depends on how one views the goals of the Guidelines and Judge Spencer's explanation for departing from them. The Guidelines are supposed to operationalize fairness and justice by providing consistent sentences based in part on factors that judges historically considered when sentencing and by providing limited discretion for judges to depart from sentences when necessary or appropriate. 245 However, if one views -justice‖ as meting out individualized, fair sentences on a case-by-case basis or believes that no guidelines can have sufficient nuance to create fair guideline sentences, a departure from a guideline sentence range is the quintessence of rendering justice.
Judge Spencer provided his general thoughts on sentencing, the Guidelines, and the case in the statement he made before sentencing Governor McDonnell. 246 He noted that he did not like mandatory sentencing guidelines, but used the Guidelines as a 251. See Green, supra note 246. The Guidelines do not ordinarily approve of a departure on those bases. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014) (-Civic, charitable, or public service; employment-related contributions; and similar prior good works are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted.‖).
252. Green, supra note 246. The Guidelines approve of a departure on that basis under certain circumstances. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.11 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014) (-Military service may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military service, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.‖).
253. The Guidelines are supposed to focus on a defendant's criminal conduct. 256 If Judge Spencer viewed the McDonnells' conduct as being somewhat less serious than their convictions suggest, a downward departure from the sentencing range calculated under the Guidelines may reflect how he believed the McDonnells should have been charged and punished. For example, if Judge Spencer believed that the McDonnells essentially engaged in a gifts scandal that involved a $15,000 payment in the form of a wedding gift, a few below-market-rate loans, and a number of gifts that were better thought of as ingratiation payments rather than as bribes, the value of the bribes paid would drop along with the McDonnells' offense level. 257 If Governor McDonnell were considered to have taken a single bribe or started the course of payments with a single agreement to help Williams and gained between $10,000 and $30,000 as a result, his offense level would fall to 22 and yield a guideline sentencing range of forty-one to fiftyone months.
258 Likewise, Mrs. McDonnell's offense level would fall to 20 and yield a guideline sentencing range of thirty-three to forty-one months. particularly large. However, minimizing the McDonnells' course of conduct in the manner suggested is problematic. Their conduct did not indicate a one-time mistake; rather, the conduct lasted for almost two years. 262 Though the scheme only involved one person, it involved a significant amount of money.
263
In contrast, one could take the middle-ground sentence calculation from the simplified vision of the McDonnells' crimes from Section C above. Under that approach, Governor McDonnell could be deemed to have accepted multiple bribes that involved just over $30,000, in which case his offense level would be 26 and his guideline sentence would be sixty-three to seventy-eight months in prison. 264 Mrs. McDonnell could be deemed to have accepted multiple bribes that involved just over $27,000, in which case her offense level would be 22 and her guideline sentence would be forty-one to fifty-one months in prison. 265 However, even with a departure that takes into consideration Governor McDonnell's military service, bribery is a breach of public trust and lowering a sixty-three-month minimum sentence to a twenty-four months seems substantial. Similarly, lowering Mrs. McDonnell's fortyone-month minimum sentence to twelve months seems significant as well.
Though a significant departure from the Guidelines may be justifiable, the departure may merely suggest a judicial preference for wide discretion in sentencing. Judge Spencer clearly did not believe the McDonnells engaged in behavior that warranted the sentence calculated under the Guidelines, but it is unclear 262. See Indictment, supra note 2, ¶ 22. 263. For those who believe that this case is more akin to illegal gratuities than bribery, the Guidelines do not provide much comfort. Illegal gratuities are punished relatively similar to bribery. Compare Hobbs Act, 18 U.S. why. The McDonnells were convicted of public corruption crimes which involved a significant amount of money and goods. Although they may be good people, the Guidelines suggest a significant sentence for this style of crime. Many factors that would trigger a lesser sentence, other than the judge's sense of fairness, are already considered by the Guidelines. 266 Of course, the Guidelines may be deficient in equilibrating sentences, and a judge's bare sense of justice may be an appropriate basis for a moderate departure from a guideline sentence. However, it is unclear that a judge's sense of justice justifies such a substantial departure from a guideline sentence as arguably occurred in the McDonnells' case.
CONCLUSION
The McDonnell case is tragic and sad, but the fundamental question of whether it involved politics as usual or public corruption appears to have been resolved. The jury found that Governor McDonnell traded official acts for significant gifts and goods, and the Fourth Circuit has somewhat clarified the definition of -official acts‖ for now. 
